This paper considers the implications for monetary policy of a decreasing demand for outside money. It finds that even perpetual declines in the demand for base money pose no threat to the traditional methods employed for conducting monetary policy. The effects of such reductions in the demand for central bank liabilities, however, do depend on how monetary policy is conducted. Four monetary policy regimes are analyzed. With a policy of nominal-interest-rate targeting, a secular decline in the volume of cash transactions unambiguously leads to accelerating inflation. A policy of maintaining a fixed composition of government liabilities leads to accelerating (decelerating) inflation if agents have sufficiently high (low) levels of risk aversion. Inflation targeting produces falling nominal and real interest rates, while a policy of fixing the rate of money growth can easily lead to indeterminacy and endogenous oscillation in interest rates. It is argued that a policy of fixing the composition of government liabilities has several advantages if it is known that agents are not too risk averse and that the asymptotic demand for base money is small. If this information is not known, then interest-rate or inflation targeting have an advantage because their consequences are not sensitive to such environmental features.
have eliminated reserve requirements on most or all intermediaries, and those that have not done so (such as the United States) have permitted financial innovations that render reserve requirements virtually inconsequential. 3 As a result, it seems entirely possible that the demand for base money may virtually or entirely vanish in the not-too-distant future. 4 These developments necessitate the reopening of some age-old questions in monetary economics: What does a declining demand for base money-and, perhaps, a demand that is declining to zero-imply for monetary policy? 5 Does it imply that certain methods of conducting monetary policy may become infeasible? Does it mean that some methods may lead to unbounded inflation or indeterminacy? And, must a central bank know whether the use of outside money will disappear altogether or just become minimal in order to determine the best course of action?
Monetary economists have posed these questions for some time, and have put forth a variety of diverse answers to them. For example, Wicksell (1898) argued that in a "pure credit"
1 For example, Lindsey and Wallich (1989, p. 231) assert that "variations in the supply of reserves relative to the demand for them, with associated impacts on the cost of reserves, other interest rates, and the stock of money, are the initial channels through which most central banks of developed capitalist countries use their policy instruments to affect the macroeconomy." 2 Cash is used, and will continue to be used in the foreseeable future, for most small consumer transactions. Such transactions constitute the majority of all transactions, but their total dollar value is relatively small (see Nilson 1997) . 3 See Sellon and Weiner (1996) . 4 At present, these statements apply only to the domestic demand for base money. Foreign holdings of dollars have increased, and probably will continue to increase for some time. However, as superior payments technologies become more generally available on a worldwide basis, presumably the same forces that have led to a declining demand for base money in the United States also will lead to a declining demand for dollars abroad. 5 Wicksell (1898) appears to be the first to consider this question.
economy the nominal rate of interest would be indeterminate, and that its realized level would have strong implications for the inflation rate. He also advocated a policy of appropriate inflation or price-level targeting to avoid these indeterminacies. One can view Patinkin (1965, p. 303) as seconding this view, and Woodford (1998) as having formalized it. Woodford also argues that a policy of targeting the rate of money growth leaves the price level indeterminate in a cashless economy. In contrast, Friedman and Schwartz (1969, p. 5) asserted that "in the hypothetical world in which there are no costs of setting up a bank and running a bank, and in which deposits transferable by check provide precisely the same services as the dominant money, there would be no limit [to the price level] … short of … infinity…." Black (1970, p. 10) proposed that in a world with no need for cash "the price level will be indeterminate, and traditional monetary theories will be inapplicable." He also argued (p. 14) that even if currency always continued to be used for some small transactions, "the quantity of money can have no effect … on prices." Which, if any, of these views is correct remains to be determined.
This paper proposes a simple framework for thinking about these issues. It begins by presenting a pure-exchange, overlapping-generations model with only two primary assetsgovernment-issued fiat currency and government bonds. To generate a demand for cash transactions, the model incorporates spatial separation and limited communication along the lines of Townsend (1987) . To generate a role for banks, the model includes shocks to liquidity needs along the lines of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . In the presence of positive nominal interest rates, these features imply a derived demand for base money that depends on the need for currency in payments and the demand by banks for cash reserves. 6 The volume of cash transactions is then assumed to evolve over time in a way that affects the total demand for base money.
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The primary focus here is on the consequences of a decline in the role of cash in transactions. Because agents have an incentive to economize on cash use only if nominal rates of interest are positive, the conduct of monetary policy with positive nominal rates of interest is 6 The model is in fact a pure-exchange version of that in Champ, Smith, and Williamson (1996) and Schreft and Smith (1997, 1998) . 7 A related paper is Dow (1995) , which studies the effect on the price level of an exogenous decline in the need for cash in a cash-in-advance model without banks. Monetary policy in his model consists of adjustments in the quantity of money accomplished through lump-sum transfers.
considered first. The presence of positive nominal interest rates, however, leads to a distortion of resource allocations, so policies implying nominal interest rates of zero also are examined. Four methods for conducting monetary policy are considered under each case. One possibility is studied is that the central bank sets the mix of government bonds and money outstanding. The central bank could instead set the money growth rate. Alternatively, it could set either a nominal-interest-rate or an inflation-rate target. Since the question of how secular declines in the use of currency affect the conduct of policy is intrinsically one that focuses on long horizons, the analysis here takes the target value for the variable being controlled as set once and for all.
Section 5 argues that this will-again, over long horizons-provide a reasonable approximation to the outcomes of policies conducted under nondestabilizing feedback rules. 
Environment
Consider an infinite-horizon economy, with t = 1,2... indexing time. 
where
is the gross real interest rate. M 0 > 0 and B 0 = 0 are given as initial conditions.
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The division of the economy into islands introduces the economically important feature of spatial separation into transactions. There is no communication across islands while transactions are being conducted. Limited communication and spatial separation imply that agents cannot exchange privately issued claims across islands. In addition, money is assumed to be the only asset that can be carried across islands and thus is the only asset that can be used in interlocation exchange. This gives money an advantage over bonds in terms of liquidity, which permits money to be dominated in rate of return.
10
Each period, after portfolio-allocation decisions are made, a fraction π t ∈ (0,1) of the young agents from each island discover that they have to relocate to the other island before the period ends. Those agents facing relocation have to hold all their wealth in the form of currency when they move or they will be unable to transact on their new island. To capture the evolution of cash transactions in the economy, π t is assumed to satisfy π π µ π π
where π is the long-run value of π t and µ ∈ (0,1] is a known constant. Thus, π t is known at the start of period t, although the identities of the specific agents facing relocation are not known.
Equation (2) In any event, the model's assumptions on interlocation exchange imply that agents who learn they will be relocated will want to convert all their assets into currency. Random relocations thus play the same role here that liquidity-preference shocks play in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . And as in Diamond-Dybvig, agents will want to insure against premature asset liquidation. This insurance can be provided efficiently (see Greenwood and Smith 1997) through a bank that announces deposit-return schedules that depend on depositor-withdrawal dates (i.e., relocation status), takes deposits, and chooses how to allocate the deposited funds between money (that is, cash reserves) and government bonds. There is free entry into banking, so competition ensures that bank profits are zero in equilibrium. As in Diamond 
Bank Behavior and General Equilibrium in Environments with Positive Nominal Interest Rates
Among other things, a bank must choose deposit-return schedules. Let r m (π t ) (r n (π t )) denote the state-contingent gross real return on deposits offered by a typical bank to agents who are (are not) relocated at t. Banks announce these returns, taking the returns offered by other banks as given. A Nash equilibrium is a deposit-return schedule (r m (π t ), r n (π t )) for each bank such that, given this return schedule, no other bank has an incentive to alter its set of announced return schedules. Competition among banks for depositors implies that, in equilibrium, banks choose deposit-return schedules to maximize the expected utility of a representative depositor subject to a set of resource constraints, which are described below. Given this behavior by banks, young agents choose to deposit their entire endowment ω, implying that all savings are intermediated.
Next, consider the representative bank's portfolio-allocation decision. Let m t denote the reserves (i.e., real balances) a representative bank chooses to hold per depositor at t, and let b t denote the real value of bonds that the bank holds per depositor at t. Then m t and b t must satisfy
By the law of large numbers, a fraction π t of a bank's depositors must relocate at t. Thus, the representative bank must pay π t r m (π t )ω to those agents at t. Relocated agents must be given currency, so the bank's payments to agents who move are constrained by its holdings of reserves:
Because agents who move at t carry into t+1 the currency they receive upon withdrawing their deposits, the promised return on deposits in (3) includes the gross real return on money, p p t t +1 . To the fraction 1−π t of a bank's depositors who do not relocate at t, the bank must pay (1−π t )r n (π t )ω upon withdrawal. Since I t > 1, money is dominated in rate of return, and the bank does not carry cash balances between periods. Payments to nonmovers, then, are financed solely with the bank's holdings of bonds; that is,
Let γ t ≥ 0 denote the reserve-deposit ratio. Then equations (3) and (4) can be written as
In a Nash equilibrium, r m (π t ), r n (π t ), and γ t are chosen to maximize
1 1
subject to (5) and (6). The optimal reserve-deposit ratio for this problem is given by
With I t > 1 at t, it is easy to verify that r m (π t ) < r n (π t ). In this case, agents receive less than complete insurance against the event of being relocated. The reason is that banks must hold reserves in order to provide insurance coverage, and with I t > 1, holding reserves involves an opportunity cost that causes agents not to desire complete insurance. As a result, the presence of positive nominal interest rates does imply a distortion of resource allocations.
Some properties of the function γ π ( , ) I t t will be useful for future reference.
Differentiation of (8) establishes that the interest elasticity of reserve demand is
The ambiguity in the sign of γ π 1 ( , ) I t t derives from conventional income and substitution effects. A higher value of I t , ceteris paribus, increases the opportunity cost of holding reserves. The substitution effect causes banks, acting on behalf of depositors, to substitute away from low-yielding assets. A higher value of I t , however, also increases the income a bank earns on its bond holdings. Standard income effects cause the bank to want to raise the consumption of relocated agents, which it can do only by holding more reserves. The substitution (income) effect dominates if ρ < (>) 1.
In addition, the elasticity of the demand for reserves with respect to the volume of cash
Thus, higher relocation probabilities (i.e., a larger volume of transactions that require cash) induce banks to hold higher levels of reserves, other things equal.
property reflects the role that banks play in providing insurance to agents who have to move.
When agents are relatively risk averse (ρ > 1), banks' reserve-deposit ratios exceed the share of deposits that will be withdrawn early (i.e., γ π ( , ) I t t ∈ [π,1]). This allows banks to pay movers a rate of return on deposits greater than the rate of return on currency, and they pay nonmovers a rate of return less than the rate of return on bonds.
It immediately follows from the relationship between ρ and γ π ( , )
In other words, the elasticity of reserve demand with respect to π t is no less than (less than) one if agents are no more (more) risk averse than they would be with logarithmic utility. 11 Intuitively, a change in π t represents a change in the risk of relocation. As depositors become relatively more risk averse, banks' reserve holdings respond more strongly to such a change.
An equilibrium for the economy described above satisfies three conditions. First, the money market must clear. Given that all beginning-of-period demand for base money derives from banks, this requirement implies that
Second, the government-bond market must clear:
Let β t denote the ratio of bonds to money outstanding (b t / m t ). Then (9) and (10) imply that I t and β t must satisfy the condition β γ π γ π
Finally, the government budget constraint, (1) 
Substituting (9) into (12) 
For a given specification of government policy, an equilibrium is thus a sequence {I t , p t , β t } that satisfies (11), (12), and (13) 
Monetary Policy in Environments with Positive Nominal Rates
The primary focus of this paper is on the consequences of a declining demand for base 
An Exogenous Bond-to-Money Ratio
When the government conducts monetary policy by fixing the bond-to-money ratio, β, in an economy where the nominal rate is positive, the following result obtains: With β fixed, equations (1) and (11) indicate that the nominal interest rate must adjust to keep the ratio of reserve demand to bond demand equal to the ratio of reserve supply to bond supply. Thus, whenever the nominal interest rate is positive, it must evolve according to
Equation (13) then determines the sequence of inflation rates:
Substituting (14) into (15) 
Furthermore, the real rate of interest, R t , evolves according to R t = I t p t / p t+1 = (1+β)I t /(1+βI t ).
The real interest rate thus inherits the behavior of the nominal interest rate. The evolution of I t and p t+1 / p t depends on the magnitudes of π and ρ. There are two cases.
From (14) and (15), when ρ < 1 a declining role for currency in the payments system must lead to a nominal interest rate and inflation rate that are falling over time. The question remains of how far they will fall. If βπ π / ( ) 1 1 − < , so that the asymptotic use of currency in payments is sufficiently small, then (14) implies that there exists a finite date, denoted by T, such that I t = 1 for all t ≥ T. Once the nominal interest rate ceases to be positive, the derivation of equilibrium above is no longer valid. However, as section 4 shows, with βπ π ( ) 1 1 − < , I t = 1 = p t / p t+1 must obtain for all t ≥ T. Both the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate therefore decline over time until, at some finite date, the opportunity cost of holding money is zero. At that point, agents have no incentive to economize further on the use of currency. The price level stabilizes at its date-T value. It is noteworthy that this result is completely independent of the value of β. Thus, regardless of the "looseness" or "tightness" of monetary policy, the price level ultimately stabilizes. However, the larger β is, the longer is the period of time over which a positive nominal interest rate can be observed. Also noteworthy is the fact that I t must eventually equal one even if π > 0 holds, so long as βπ π 1 1 − < b g . This means that the attainment of a zero nominal interest rate and price stability does not require that the fraction of transactions requiring cash goes to zero. It also means that in finite time banks will provide complete insurance. 
. Thus, whatever the asymptotic use of currency, a diminishing role for currency in transactions leads to a declining nominal interest rate and inflation rate.
Case 2: ρ > 1
When ρ > 1, (14) implies that I t must be rising over time. Equation (16) implies that the rate of inflation must also be rising. Consequently, a declining demand for currency in transactions leads to a monotonically increasing nominal interest rate and accelerating inflation.
To summarize, when the central bank fixes the bond-to-money ratio, the effects of a diminishing role for currency in transactions depend heavily on the magnitude of ρ. When ρ < (>) 1, the substitution (income) effect dominates in the response of reserve demand to a change in the nominal interest rate, so as π t falls, the nominal rate declines (rises). And because the interest elasticity of reserve demand is less than (greater than) zero when ρ < (>) 1, a declining (rising) nominal interest rate is associated with a declining (rising) inflation rate and real rate of interest.
Nominal-Interest-Rate Targeting
The following proposition summarizes the effect of a declining demand for currency for transactions when the government targets a constant value I > 1.
Proposition 2. A central bank that pegs the nominal interest rate in the face of a declining π t must continuously increase the bond-to-money ratio and must do so at a more rapid rate than the contraction in the demand for reserves. Because the supply of base money decreases less rapidly than the demand for reserves, the interest-rate peg commits the economy to rising but bounded inflation.
To derive this result, observe that equations (1) and (11) 
Thus, as π t declines, the central bank must raise the bond-to-money ratio to keep the nominal interest rate constant. In effect, then, the central bank must drain base money from the economy via open market sales. This is true regardless of the magnitude of ρ.
In addition, (11) with I t = I describes the evolution of the demand for reserves. As noted previously, when the nominal interest rate is constant, a secular decline in the value of π t induces a less (more) than proportional decline in reserve demand if ρ > (<) 1. Thus, the demand for base money may decline either more rapidly or more slowly than the volume of cash transactions. Differentiation of (17) establishes that (π t /β t )(dβ t /dπ t ) = −(1−π t ) −1 . The central bank therefore must increase the bond-to-money ratio more rapidly than the volume of cash transactions contracts if it is to peg the nominal interest rate successfully.
With respect to the rate of inflation, (17) and (13) imply that ( 
Since γ π 2 1 ( , ) I t − > 0, it follows from (18) that the equilibrium inflation rate must be rising over time as π t−1 declines. Intuitively, the supply of base money decreases less rapidly than the demand for reserves, driving the inflation rate up over time. For any value of π , the inflation rate attains an upper bound that is no greater than I. With I constant, it follows that the real interest rate declines over time along with π t−1 , and obtains a lower bound that is greater than or equal to one. Both statements hold regardless of the magnitude of ρ.
If π = 0, so that asymptotically cash use is zero when I > 1, (18) 
Inflation Targeting
Alternatively, the government could set a target φ for the gross inflation rate so that
With such a target, the central bank generates inflation, which is sufficient to guarantee a positive nominal interest rate in equilibrium. The only alternative is to set φ = 1, which might, but need not, lead to a zero nominal interest rate. 13 This policy is considered in section 4. Proposition 3 describes equilibrium outcomes under a positive target for the inflation rate.
Proposition 3. If the central bank targets a positive net inflation rate, the nominal interest rate decreases (increases) as π t decreases (increases).
To see this, notice that equations (11) and (13) imply the satisfaction of the following condition at each date:
With φ > 1 and/or π > 0, (19) necessarily has a unique solution with I t > 1 in every period.
Now consider the effect of changes in the demand for currency in transactions on the equilibrium evolution of the nominal interest rate. Differentiation of (19) 
. Intuitively, as the demand for cash for transactions falls, the demand for reserves falls and the demand for bonds rises. Given the inflation tax rate, then, seigniorage revenue decreases, so the nominal and real interest rate must decline along with π t to satisfy the government budget constraint. 13 If φ < 1, it is straightforward to verify that (19) has no solution with I t ≥ 1 at any date.
Proposition 3 has a corollary: With a fixed inflation rate, as π t declines, the real interest rate necessarily falls over time. This consequence of a diminishing role of currency in transactions was also observed under a nominal-interest-rate target.
It remains to consider how the bond-to-money ratio must evolve to keep the inflation rate at its target level. It is easily established that dβ t / dπ t < 0, so the central bank must continuously raise the ratio to maintain its target. When π = 0, (19) implies that lim 
A Constant Rate of Money Creation
With a constant rate of money supply growth, σ > 1, the effects of a declining demand for currency for transactions are more complicated, as the following proposition indicates. 
Using (20) and (11) in (13) gives the equilibrium law of motion for I t when I t > 1: 
Equations (2) and (21) govern the evolution of the sequence {I t , π t }.
Steady-State Equilibria with π > 0
In a steady state, π t = π > 0. Imposing π t = π t-1 = π and I t = I t−1 = I in (21) yields the condition that determines the steady-state nominal interest rate: 
Dynamics with π > 0
Simple algebraic manipulation establishes that equation (21) can be written as
Linearizing (23) Since I 1 is an endogenous initial condition, the equilibrium value I 1 must place the economy on its stable manifold. Consequently, there is a unique equilibrium, and that equilibrium displays monotonic convergence to the steady state.
The steady state is a sink (saddle) if I/σ < (>) ρ −1. Moreover, using equation (22)
. Clearly, the steady state is a sink if ρ > 2, and if either π is sufficiently close to zero or σ is sufficiently close to one.
When I/σ < ρ −1, any choice of I 1 sufficiently close to I allows the steady state to be approached, so dynamical equilibria are indeterminate. Moreover, equilibrium paths approaching the steady state will display oscillations. In other words, endogenously arising volatility will be observed. That is, whenever ρ > 2, and whenever the asymptotic use of currency is sufficiently small, a fixed money growth rate must lead to a situation of indeterminacy and endogenous volatility. Both the nominal rate of interest and the price level must fluctuate along any equilibrium path.
Note that the endogenous volatility that emerges might not vanish asymptotically.
Indeed, for certain values of π and for fixed values of σ, equilibria will exist that display twoperiod cycles. Thus, the policy of fixing a rate of money growth can easily lead to the existence of permanent fluctuations. Such fluctuations cannot occur under the other policy regimes analyzed.
An Asymptotically "Cashless" Economy
When π = 0, (23) reduces to
In a steady state then, π t = 0 and I t = σ/µ. It is possible to show that there is no equilibrium with I t = 1 for t sufficiently large. That is, the nominal interest rate cannot converge to zero, asymptotically or otherwise. Thus, as in Woodford (1998) , the "cashless-limit economy" (i.e., one with π = 0) has a steady state nominal and real interest rate that is not the limiting solution of (22) 
Monetary Policy in Environments with Zero Nominal Rates
A necessary condition for a policy to be Pareto optimal in this model is that I t = 1 for all t ≥ 1. When nominal interest rates are zero, banks perceive no opportunity cost associated with holding cash reserves to accommodate the withdrawal demand of relocated agents. Hence banks might carry reserves between periods, and a different approach must be adopted to characterize equilibria of the model. Let α t denote the fraction of cash reserves that a bank carries between t and t+1. To compete for deposits, a representative bank must choose values r m (π t ), r n (π t ), 
(1)()(1)1,1 tnttttttt rRppt ππγαγ
The solution to this problem, with I t = 1, is to set ( ) ( )
Thus, banks provide complete insurance against the event of relocation because there is no cost to doing so with I t =1. At the same time, for this insurance provision to be feasible, it is necessary that banks have cash reserves adequate to meet the needs of relocated agents. This requires that
and ttt απγ ≥ . These are the only restrictions on γ t and α t implied by bank maximization.
In a general equilibrium with I t = 1, clearly tttt Mpm γω ≡= and
Thus, the bond-to-money ratio is ( ) It turns out that when I t = 1 for all t, the sequences {γ t } and {M t } may well be indeterminate. Indeed, the only restriction on these quantities, except for (26) Under appropriate choices of targets, the policies considered in section 3 all can deliver an equilibrium with a zero nominal interest rate, but they do not necessarily do so. For example, if a policy of nominal-interest-rate targeting is used and the target is set to zero, then the sequences {γ t } and {M t } are indeterminate. The only requirement imposed on these sequences in equilibrium is that {γ t } satisfy (26). Obviously, under this policy, the only equilibrium has a zero nominal interest rate. And neither real nor nominal cash balances need decline over time.
Likewise, a policy of fixing an appropriate money growth rate or bond-to-money ratio necessarily achieves a zero nominal rate. If the government attempts to maintain I t = 1 for all t with a money-growth target, then strong constraints exist on feasible rates of money creation.
Indeed, if Of course, it is also possible for the government to attain a zero nominal interest rate by other means. For instance, the central bank could provide banks with unrestricted access to the discount window at a discount rate of zero. Or, the government could let banks print banknotes.
If it is costless to borrow from the discount window or to print notes, then such policies lead to no-arbitrage conditions that force the nominal interest rate to be zero. In either case, the analysis of equilibrium proceeds as in section 4. 15 Finally, when I t = 1, agents (and banks) have no incentive to economize on cash use (or reserve holdings). Consequently, if the demand for base money declines over time with I t = 1, it does so only by accident, or as a result of how policy is conducted. This is certainly inconsistent with observed trends in the decline in the domestic demand for base money.
Comparison of Policy Regimes
When nominal interest rates are at least potentially positive, three key findings arise from the analysis of the preceding sections. First, a declining demand for outside money does not imply that any of the conventional methods of conducting monetary policy will cease to be feasible. This is true even if the demand for base money declines to zero. Second, the impact of a declining demand for currency for transactions varies considerably across the policy regimes considered. The equilibrium time paths for the interest rate, the inflation rate, and the composition of government liabilities are quite different across the regimes, and one method for conducting policy allows considerable scope for the indeterminacy of equilibrium and for endogenously generated volatility, while the others do not. Third, one method for conducting policy can result in price stability and zero nominal interest rates in finite time if π is sufficiently small, independent of the choice of policy parameter. Other policies do not share this feature.
In general, it is quite difficult to rank the various policies on the basis of welfare in environments with positive nominal rates. To conduct a welfare analysis, one must first find a way to make the stance of monetary policy comparable across policy regimes. One way this can be done is by ensuring that the steady state interest rate arising under each policy is about the same. When this is done, the differences in welfare across regimes are found to be relatively minor and no uniform ranking of the regimes emerges.
One unambiguous statement can be made, however. When ρ < 1 and βπ π 1 1 − < b g , price stability and a zero nominal interest rate are attained in finite time under a policy that maintains a fixed bond-money ratio. A zero nominal interest rate is attractive because it allows banks to provide complete insurance provision against the risk of relocation. If π = 0, then there will be a finite date T such that for all t T ≥ , young agents unambiguously prefer a policy of fixing the bond-money ratio to a policy of targeting either the nominal rate of interest or the inflation rate. Thus, in an asymptotically cashless economy, ultimately agents will prefer the policy of fixing the bond-money ratio to either a nominal-interest-rate or inflation-rate target that implies I t > 1. Matters are quite different, however, when ρ > 1. A policy of fixing the bond-tomoney ratio leads to an ever rising nominal interest rate and inflation. This will not be the case under nominal-interest-rate targeting or inflation targeting.
This and the earlier observations suggest the following conclusion. Under the policy of maintaining a fixed bond-to-money ratio-or under a policy of maintaining a fixed rate of money growth-in environments with positive nominal interest rates, the policy authority must know a good deal about ρ and π to predict the consequences of the policy. It is unlikely that the policy authority will be able to estimate ρ and π using data on observable variables such as the interest rate, inflation, or even the evolution of cash transactions, { } t π . In the case of an exogenous bond-to-money ratio, for example, equations (14) and (15) make clear that knowledge of the interest rate and/or inflation rate does not allow determination of ρ or t π , and certainly not π .
Since under interest-rate or inflation targeting, economic dynamics do not depend on the parameters ρ and π , these policies might be more desirable.
When, instead, the government attempts to achieve a zero nominal interest rate permanently, the analysis leads to the following conclusions. what happens as cash use becomes small or nonexistent? Asymptotically, the feedback rule implies either that I t converges to a limiting value, or that I t has no well-defined limit. In the former case, the analysis with a constant target value of I provides the correct answer about the long-run consequences of a declining demand for base money. In the latter case, the failure of I t to converge is, as the previous analysis shows, purely a consequence of how policy is conducted, rather than a consequence of declining cash usage. Hence, the focus on constant target values of I t implies little loss of generality in the analysis. Of course, in the short run, the function g will impart its own dynamics to the behavior of endogenous variables. But these depend only on how the government behaves, not on the evolution of cash transactions in the economy.
Concluding Remarks
The preceding analysis abstracts from several features that are relevant to modern-day payment systems. For example, the focus on a pure-exchange economy makes it impossible for developments in the technology of payments to affect the level of production. Endogenizing production levels would allow the evolution of cash transactions to affect real activity, which in turn might modify some conclusions about how this evolution affects the behavior of the price level or the behavior of real and nominal interest rates. And by allowing for capital accumulation, the model would intrinsically have much richer dynamics.
A second feature from which the model abstracts is the mechanism by which the demand for cash evolves. One can regard the specification of an exogenous law of motion for π t as a "reduced-form" approach that implicitly takes no stand on the economic forces governing the use of cash in transactions. Clearly, it would be more satisfying to model these forces explicitly.
Likewise, it would be better to model the choice between cash and other instruments to make payments. Modeling that choice (for example, as done in Schreft 1992 and Ireland 1994) would endogenize the evolution of cash use and might not alter any of the results derived above.
Third, the model abstracts from the existence of a market in which reserves can be borrowed and lent. The presence of such a market has in principle the potential to substantially affect the demand by banks for reserves. And reserve demand is at the heart of the analysis here.
Introducing a market for reserves into the model is straightforward. The most natural approach is to assume that each bank faces a stochastic demand for cash withdrawals (that is, a random value of π t ), but that there is no aggregate randomness. This introduces an additional feature into a bank's decision regarding its reserve holdings: banks face uncertainty regarding withdrawal demand. If banks must choose their reserve-deposit ratio before observing their withdrawal demand, then ex post some banks will have more, and some will have fewer, reserves than needed to pay depositors. This fact leads naturally to the introduction of a market in which banks with a reserve surplus (deficit) can lend (borrow) reserves.
While the introduction of a stochastic withdrawal demand and a market for reserves that resembles today's federal funds market adds some notational complexity, it does not alter the 
